Could the whole (development) problem be solved simply by increasing the growth rate of manufactured exports to MDCs (more developed countries), in substitution for primary products? I shall assume this cannot be done…..Also I think it cannot be done. W. Arthur Lewis, Nobel Lecture, 1979. Lewis' pessimistic outlook for industrial development in what we now call emerging markets was based on the view that developed countries allowed access to their markets only during brief periods of prosperity since "they then have many growing industries that can take the people displaced by imports." Otherwise, they act to block access to manufactured imports from cheap labor countries to protect domestic workers. In this paper, we will argue that some emerging markets in Asia have found, perhaps by accident, a way around this fundamental obstacle to industrial and economic development. The solution has created the basic features of the current international monetary system. Along the way to making this argument, we will characterize the exchange rate and other policies designed to eliminate the vast underemployment in Asia as a solution to an exhaustible resource problem. Notably, the welcoming of FDI is a solution to Lewis's conundrum in industrial development. Finally, we will propose a view that the main features of international finance are organized to overcome such inherent protectionism, rather than rather than as a solution to an inter-temporal consumption problem.
International Monetary Systems are Endogenous Solutions
Whatever are the institutions and mechanisms of the international monetary system at any moment, they have emerged as solutions to a key real economic problem of the time.
The Bretton Woods system was a top-down solution to what were perceived as the crucial problems of the depression and World War 2. A deal between the US and UK, its basic features were a compromise between the between the conflicting economic interests of the two parties. The US viewed the competitive devaluations of the 1930s and the subsequent discriminatory trading blocs as detrimental to stability and especially harmful to US trade. A creditor country with intact capital and promising exports, it was interested in currency stability and non-discriminatory, open trading systems. The UK was determined not to sacrifice internal balance to maintain external balance. It wanted currency flexibility. With its huge sterling debt and its unbalance war mobilization, it was interested also in maintaining controls and channeling of trade within the sterling bloc. Finally, it wanted access to official credit in large amounts if it was to maintain fixed rates. The compromise was to have fixed exchange rates but with flexibility within the rules, a gradual lifting of controls, and access to credit as a function of official quotas. This basic outline of the system lasted for the next 25 years.
The current system is also one of fixed exchange rates, the accumulation of dollar reserves, and is based on an effort to keep trade flows open. However, it is an ad hoc, bottom-up system, the sum of independent policy choices across and within countries. But it likewise has emerged to solve the fundamental real economic problem of our time: the emergence of 200 million underemployed workers into the global industrial economy.
Revived Bretton Woods
In a series of papers, we have characterized the international monetary system that has evolved to facilitate this development strategy in some periphery countries as a revival of the Bretton Woods system. 1 The revival has been contemporaneous with rapid deterioration of the net international investment position of the United States, and this has raised concerns about the stability of the system. 2 We have argued that the reluctance of private investors to increase their net claims on the United States has, as conventional analysis suggests, contributed to a depreciation of the dollar against floating currencies, but that this has not even started to force an adjustment of the US international investment position.
The reason is no mystery; governments in Asia are providing the necessary financing. The issue now is how long this can continue. The conventional view is that the Asian governments can fill the gap for only a short interval and, when the wheels fall off, the adjustment costs for the world economy will be very heavy. 3 The mechanism for the disaster is familiar. Expectations for the large exchange rate change "needed" to "correct" current imbalances generate massive private capital flows to the periphery. Capital controls and financial repression are no match for a determined private sector. If inflows are not sterilized, the monetary base explodes and the "needed" real exchange rate adjustment comes through inflation. Faced with this unpleasant reality central banks give up and revalue nominal exchange rates.
The conventional argument is a good description of the final days of the original Bretton Woods system. It is relevant for countries that are ready to graduate to the center. But it ignores the fact that the system lasted for two decades. To be sure, the original Bretton Woods system was not asked to finance a US current account deficit until its closing days, but the periphery did benefit from rapid growth of trade and financed a substantial 1 Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003a , 2004a , 2004b . 2 The discomfort with the current situation was carefully set out several years ago (Mann, 1999; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000) . The logic is that although international capital markets were much larger and more resilient than in the past they could not support a US current account deficit of 5% of GDP for long. Moreover, even a mild withdrawal of credit from the US-for example a reduction in financing that required a return to current account balance-would generate a very large and sudden depreciation in the real value of the dollar. The sensitivity of real exchange rates to changes in current accounts is related to the limited integration of goods markets across countries. A related concern then and now is that the low level of private and government savings in the US is generating a perverse flow of world savings to the United States. Summers (2004) has recently argued, for example, that the single engine for world recovery, US growth and US fiscal deficits, is a recipe for disaster both for the US and the rest of the world. increase in US direct and long term investments abroad. Moreover, most governments in the periphery did not decide that the system was no longer in their interests. They were forced to abandon the regime by private capital flows. The erosion of the effectiveness of capital controls and domestic financial repression that made this possible followed the development of international trade and domestic financial markets, and this process took many years.
The current version of the Bretton Woods system presents the periphery with similar policy choices. 4 We argue below that expansion of the volume of trade in goods and services and the volume of two way trade in financial assets is the backbone of a successful industrialization/development strategy. If the price to be paid for this strategy includes financing a large US current account deficit governments in the periphery will see it in their interest to provide financing even in circumstances where private international investors would not.
The catastrophic losses and abrupt price breaks forecast by the conventional wisdom of international macroeconomics arise from a model of very naïve government behavior. In that model, periphery governments stubbornly maintain a distorted exchange rate until it is overwhelmed by speculative capital flows. In our view a more sensible political economy guides governments in Asia. The objectives are the rapid mobilization of underemployed Asian labor and the accumulation of a capital stock that will remain efficient even after the system ends.
The mechanism that regulates the mobilization is a cross-border transfer to countries like the United States that are willing to restructure their labor markets to accommodate the rapid growth of industrial employment in Asia. Net imbalances like those now observed for the United States may or may not be a byproduct of this system. But such imbalances are only one of the constraints on the system, and for considerable periods of time may not be as binding a constraint as in conventional theories.
What Force Drives the Global System?
China has about 200 million unemployed or underemployed workers to bring into the modern labor force. For political stability, there is a need for 10-12 million net new jobs per year in the urban centers. A growth rate of around 8+% has served to employ about 10 million new workers each year. About 3 million have been in the export sector.
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If the world can absorb politically only the output of an additional 10 million workers per year (3 million in the export sector), then simple arithmetic indicates that this surplus is a force for twenty years more in the global system. If it can absorb the surplus faster, say at a rising absolute rate that will keep the Chinese growth rate constant at 8% until the surplus is eliminated, then straightforward compounding and linearity assumptions indicate that this will drive the global system ever more relentlessly for the next 12 years).
We do not take a stand on how long this force will drive the global system. But twelve to twenty years has defined an era for any recent international monetary system.
Political Economy of Export Led Growth
Our analysis of government behavior has some surprising implications. Perhaps the most important is the idea that there is a trade off between objectives for inter-temporal trade, objectives for net international investment positions, and objectives for growth in gross trade in goods and financial instruments. In the framework we develop, governments have well defined objectives for export growth and for the pattern of international financial intermediation. Within limits, they are willing to finance net capital flows when net flows are a byproduct of this development strategy. The limits are likely to be much less of a constraint on the international system than is suggested by conventional analysis. Our framework does not, for example, explain the source of the US current account deficit. But it does provide an explanation for the relative willingness of Asian governments to finance that deficit.
Governments care about gross trade and capital flows because both generate important externalities that are not captured by private firms and investors. Domestic production of traded goods subjects firms to the discipline of international competition and world prices, a discipline not imposed by distorted domestic markets for goods and services. Domestic capital formation by foreign direct investors financed in international capital markets bypasses distorted domestic financial markets. A sensible development strategy provides strong incentives for foreign direct investors to utilize unemployed domestic labor to produce for export markets. The emerging market is in effect "borrowing" the right relative prices and financial incentives from world markets to guide capital formation during a transition to full participation in the world economy.
But, as Lewis suggested, access to import markets comes at a price. Penetration of markets in industrial countries will generate a protectionist response. We do not argue that imports "cause" unemployment in the importing country, but it is clear to us that industrialization of the periphery requires a fundamental restructuring of the labor force in the center. While this creates tremendous aggregate benefits for both countries, established industries and their workers in the center are displaced. No country has found a workable way to compensate its own losers. So a surplus must be generated and properly allocated to provide additional incentives to overcome protection. In short, we believe in gains from trade but also believe that gains from trade are not enough to insure that mutually beneficial trade will automatically occur. Our conjecture is that this distortion alone is sufficient to keep labor in the periphery in domestic zero marginal product activities.
The recent reduction of private capital inflows to the United States and the appreciation of the euro and other floating currencies provide an opportunity for fixed rate emerging markets to replace European exports to the United States without changing the rate at which US labor markets absorbs total imports. Even if governments weigh the same risks of financing net deficits as do private investors, governments also see benefits of accelerating their development strategies. It follows that the US will, other things equal, be able to maintain larger increases in its net international debt over time.
Exhaustible Resources
The economics underlying the current international monetary system is best viewed through the lens of an exhaustible resource model. The exhaustible resource is the pool of Asian labor that is underemployed by industrial country standards. Left underemployed, it is politically dangerous and socially costly. Once employed it produces a stream of product marginally valued at the global real wage and contributes to social and political stability. So the government would like to employ labor in the industrial sector as quickly as possible. The government also wants to insure that at the end of the transition period the capital stock should be capable, when combined with domestic labor paid the world real wage, of producing goods going forward that are competitive with those produced in other countries. This is a crucial constraint: makework projects or great leaps forward will not do because the history of development has shown repeatedly that this is the way to end-game crisis.
There are two reasons that employment is increasingly costly in the rate of employment growth. First, we make the usual assumption that investment installation costs rise in the rate of investment over time, the usual bottleneck argument. It follows that a more rapid adjustment requires a greater cost of capital per worker.
Second, investors have to make transfers to offset the political power of displaced workers in the importing country. Again, it seems likely that the adjustment costs in the country restructuring its labor market are increasing in the rate of import penetration. Put another way, a larger piece of the new product stream must be paid to the importing country the faster is the absorption of the unemployed pool.
In the current global system, benefits are shared with importing countries by initially giving foreign capital access to Asian labor at a low domestic real wage relative to the world real wage. This gives the capitalist excess profits for some time period and provides the resources for the capitalist to utilize to keep home country import markets open. The trick is to set the real wage (real exchange rate) low enough and to adjust it gradually upward to the expected real wage in the rest of the world until the excess labor pool is exhausted, all at a minimum cost. The optimal strategy for the government is to set the initial wage and the rate of change in the wage in order to employ fully the stock of unemployed labor at a minimum cost.
Consider first the rate of change for the real wage. An additional unit of labor employed provides a nonnegative yield to the government b. A unit of unemployed labor costs government a yield of -r. The yield b can be thought of as tax revenue or political support for the government. The yield -r might be transfers to the unemployed or political opposition.
The incentive with which the government sweetens the provision of labor to investors is the present value of the difference between the domestic real wage and the world real wage. Suppose the government kept this present value constant for two consecutive time periods. A constant incentive generates a constant flow of new employment. If the incentive in the first period was set slightly higher than in the second period, less unemployed labor will be carried over into the second period. The carryover is costly so a constant incentive cannot be optimal. The government can get the same increase in employment at a lower cost by frontloading the adjustment.
Since it is in the government's interest to reduce the incentive over time, the present value of the sequence of market wages must be expected to rise. While there are some complicated interactions between marginal costs of extraction and the optimal adjustment path in any real world application, the result that the wage rises monotonically to the equilibrium level is quite general.
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Paths AB and CD in Chart 1 satisfy this rate of change condition. Path AB starts from w 1 , a relatively high initial real wage, and increases at the optimal rate . Path CD begins with w 2 and rises at the same rate. The full solution to the Hotelling (1931) problem requires that the government sets the initial wage so that the initial stock of labor is employed when the domestic wage rises to the world wage. Clearly, a lower initial real wage path CD generates more total employment over the interval from t 0 to T 2 as compared to path AB from t 0 to T 1. It follows that the integral of employment increases as the initial wage declines and only one initial wage fully employs the initial labor supply.
It also follows that a country with a very large stock of labor to employ will want to set a real exchange rate that appears to be grossly undervalued by conventional measures.
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Moreover, the adjustment period is determined by the equilibrium adjustment path and, other things equal, is longer the larger the initial stock of labor to be employed. Without government coordination individual workers could not internalize the benefits from rapid capital accumulation and open export markets. They would therefore demand higher wages and live with slower employment growth and a longer adjustment period.
We can summarize this section as follows. The optimal exchange rate and inflation policy are derived from the exhaustible resource problem. For a fixed exchange rate regime only one initial real exchange rate is optimal and only one rate of inflation generates the optimal path for the real wage over time. The length of the adjustment period is determined and at its end the following conditions hold:
The domestic real wage equals the world real wage in the manufacturing sector. The initial pool of surplus labor is employed. The capital stock has increased to match the world capital/labor ratio in manufacturing. The political costs of adjusting displaced labor and capital in the importing country have been compensated. This co-opts attempts to use commercial policy to freeze out the exports that are vital to the development policy.
An Indeterminacy: Adjust Nominal Wages or Nominal Exchange Rates?
The optimal adjustment path for the real wage allows the authorities to choose a path for the nominal wage rate or the nominal exchange rate but not both independently. In fact Asian authorities use both techniques. For a fixed exchange rate regime, the central bank manages the inflation rate in order to regulate the dollar value of domestic wages and prices. In this case we would expect wage inflation to be above that in the center so that domestic real wages rise over time. The alternative would be to set domestic wage and price inflation at or below that in the center and then allow the nominal exchange rate to appreciate over time but at a controlled rate.
As long as private market participants understand that policy is driven by the objectives set out above-the optimal path for the real wage rate--the same pattern of real private capital flows and trade account will be generated by either a fixed or managed float exchange rate arrangement. From the balance-of-payments accounting identity, it follows that the path of real and nominal official intervention is invariant to whether a fixed rate or managed float regime is chosen. Those who argue the necessity of switching to a managed appreciation because of the large accumulation of official reserves are missing the basic policy problem and its resolution. Moreover, switching from fixed to managed floating, perhaps in the face of political pressure from the center, would not alter the real nature of the transition.
The Key Role of Financial Repression
A key to this regime is the ability of the government to repress real wages for an extended period of time. In our framework, this is equivalent to controlling the rate of inflation and the nominal exchange rate. Given a foreign rate of inflation and an international interest rate, this requires that the link between domestic and international interest rates be broken. In our view, China has more than adequate controls on domestic and international financial transactions to make this possible.
Purchases of international bonds are strictly controlled. State owned or controlled banks provide all the claims available for domestic savers. The government sets the interest rate on these bank liabilities and rations bank credit to the private sector. Growth in the foreign part of the monetary base is determined by the current account surplus plus targeted net direct investment inflows.
In this repressed domestic financial system, growth in domestic credit from the banking system is a residual, that is, the difference between desired money base growth, (determined by the desired rate of inflation), the growth in the demand for money and the growth in the foreign part of the base. Domestic savings not purchased by the banking system are absorbed by sales of domestic treasury or central bank securities to households and firms. Note that as long as the real interest rate that clears this market is not above the return on US treasury securities or other forms of investing the fx reserves, the government can absorb domestic savings and intermediate into foreign bonds while booking an accounting profit.
The government rations credit to the private sector by forcing the banks to buy government securities through liquidity and reserve requirements and then rations the remaining credit to the private sector at fixed lending rates. This of course sets up strong incentives for private lenders and borrowers to go offshore or to alternative domestic intermediaries. We assume that the government is an effective counterforce to such financial innovation for the requisite amount of time.
Internal Balance
The macro management problem for the government in implementing this policy is daunting but simple enough to set out. In pursing the employment objective, a distorted real exchange rate will create imbalances in the economy that require an additional policy instrument. As noted above, the bottom line is that the government must be able to manage the domestic real interest rate throughout the adjustment period to keep the domestic economy in balance. The good news is that the problems are large but diminish over time.
To make this argument, assume the economy, aside from the 200 million, is in full employment equilibrium with effective capital controls, no initial net international investment position, and an exchange rate that balances trade. To set the problem in motion, now imagine that 200 million unemployed people appear from the provinces. As discussed above, the path for the real exchange rate that solves the absorption problem involves a sudden real depreciation that is gradually eliminated. The exchange rate path that solves the absorption problem therefore subsidizes exports relative to imports and the trade balance initially moves from balance to surplus.
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The initial current account surplus must equal the amount by which domestic (government plus private) savings exceeds domestic absorption. It follows that a rise in the domestic interest rate is needed to reduce absorption relative to savings. But what happens to the interest rate that insures internal balance over time?
During the adjustment period the trade surplus as a share of GDP will decline and may move into deficit as the real exchange rate appreciates and domestic income grows more rapidly than foreign income. A surplus on the service account will appear and grow as net asset accumulation generates net capital income. But the overall current account as a percent of domestic GDP will fall for any reasonable set of parameters. It follows that the domestic interest rate will fall over time as a smaller share of domestic absorption is crowded out by net transfers abroad. This mitigates the interest differential pressure on capital controls.
Sterilization and Inflation
The relevant capital flow "problem" in the face of expected revaluation is large private capital inflows. If private capital inflows augment the monetary base and in turn increase domestic inflation, real wage growth will be too rapid; and the transition will be too short to accomplish the government's objectives. However, if capital inflows are sterilized, and if domestic financial repression allows the government to finance reserve creation by issuing low interest domestic securities, the inflationary impact is eliminated.
This is an empirical issue. Capital controls and financial repression do not last forever but neither does the regime we are describing. We simply observe that to date Asian governments have been very successful in hitting aggressive inflation targets. In the case of China, for example, some observers have suggested that overheating and an inflationary spiral are already underway. In our view, that is more of a prediction than an observation. Time will tell, but we would point out that there are many reasons why inflation may have increased in recent months. In general, a growth rate of 8+% has not generated inflation in China. In our view increases in reserve requirements last year, a form of sterilization, have already reduced the growth in money and credit. Moreover this has been accomplished with no increase in administered interest rates.
If the capital account is liberalized, expectations of appreciation that are a central feature of the regime discussed below will generate capital inflows. Moreover, marketdetermined domestic interest rates would make sterilization expensive and so inflation would be the eventual result. But we do not expect opening of the capital account or deregulation of domestic interest rates. It follows that the economic linkages between exchange rate policy and inflation clearly relevant for capital account countries do not now exist, and we do not expect them to materialize for many years.
The Transfer to Foreign Capital
The regime set out so far encourages capital formation in export industries and makes room for this new investment in the domestic market. But it does not suggest that nonresident direct investors are the best placed to do the investing. Recall however that the investor has to expect that the foreign markets for exports remain open and that the political costs of displaced workers in the importing countries must be compensated.
A transparent but unrealistic example will help make the point. Suppose the right to supply capital is allocated by the government through licenses on a project-by-project basis. The gap between the domestic and world real wage would then be captured by selected capitalists 9 . Moreover, the government could lend through domestic balance sheets to the direct investor and finance this by sales of securities to the domestic market. The government can reduce the political costs to foreign governments associated with rapid export growth by allocating some of this capital to foreign investors that are adept at penetrating countries that allow the rapid growth of imports. In the present context, with the US absorbing much of the exports, this allocation would go to those FDI investors who can push goods into the US. This provides an economic rent until the convergence of real wages at T, which is not competed away because entry into foreign direct investment is rationed by the Chinese government.
The foreign investors then become a well-financed and effective lobby to counteract the resistance to the restructuring of the US labor force away from import substitutes.
10 Each time a worker is matched with foreign capital, the direct investor gets a benefit equal to the discounted value of the wage differential plus the normal return to capital. The excess returns are implicitly paid by the Chinese workers accepting the low but rising real wage. Indeed, from the US balance sheet perspective, there is no real export of capital from the US to China. All is financed by directed Chinese savings, both the US current account deficit and the onshore loans to the foreign investor. The US balance sheet taken as a whole simply intermediates between low yielding Chinese deposits and high yielding FDI investments.
But perhaps this method of local intermediation is too transparent and difficult politically. Instead, the government could sell the same domestic security mentioned above but, rather than make a loan to a direct investor, purchase international reserves in the direct investor's home credit market. This acquisition of foreign assets favors the importing country in general rather than just the foreign investor. The foreign investor then has to borrow in the importing country at his own normal cost of funds, and then buy yuan to make the investment. Part of the subsidy to the foreigner is then given to the importing country as a whole, part to the FDI investor in the form of rents from access to low real wage labor. Again, no real capital flows from the US to China-both the US current account deficit and the measured FDI outflow are financed by Chinese savings. Whether it is booked as FDI or investment managed by foreigners is irrelevant.
Politically, this is perhaps better because there is an arms length relationship between the government and the financing of the foreign investor. With this more competitive mechanism we would expect that the surplus generated by access to low wages in China would be absorbed by adjustment costs. In this case direct investors from countries with open import markets might enjoy a competitive advantage over other foreign and domestic investors because they can more effectively mobilize profits to make transfer payments to their fellow residents.
At this point we do not understand well the mechanism that allocates investment in the export sector, its profitability or the distribution of those profits. 11 It is also quite possible that direct investment is restricted and/or the risk that the regime might end prematurely requires excess profits in order to insure entry. The net profitability of direct investment is an important ingredient in the evolution of net international investments positions during the transition. Data on profitability of direct investment in China is anecdotal at best. We can make a reasonable guess about the gap between the real wage and marginal product of labor, but we do not have much information about the distribution of the implied surplus. This is an important topic for further research.
What about the accumulating balance sheet positions?
Headline numbers for reserve accumulation and the US current account deficits seem to suggest that the main end game problem is the accumulated net international investment position of the center and the periphery. But net positions are the difference between two much larger gross assets and liabilities. Just as in the original Bretton Woods System, official intervention, that is, large official capital outflows from the periphery are largely associated with private capital inflows to the periphery. In our view the financial intermediation and the capital gains and losses generated will substantially mitigate problems associated with the net international investment positions generated by export led growth.
At the end of the transition period Asian governments will hold a large stock of US treasury and other securities on which it has earned a relatively low but positive rate of return. It will also have incurred a large stock of liabilities to domestic claimants. But at the end of the game, both of these will carry the same international interest rate. The US will hold a large stock of direct investment which pays the world equity rate going forward but which has paid a much higher rate during the adjustment interval.
It may be instructive to take another look at the end of the original Bretton Woods system with these two points in mind. While a careful historical comparison is beyond our resources at the moment it is clear that the United States did not run large trade deficits leading up to the 1971-73 crisis that ended the regime. The "balance of payments deficit" that observers focused on at the time was the liquidity balance, a concept that put short term capital inflows below the line. As Depres, Kindleberger and Salant (1966) pointed out in their celebrated letter to the Economist, this concept of a deficit ignores the legitimate role of financial intermediation in international financial arrangements. To be sure, financial intermediation can lead to instability and crises. But the problem is much more subtle and the "lessons" from countries that have run large and persistent current account deficits may not be of much use in evaluating the new Bretton Woods.
Conclusions
What makes this perpetual motion machine run is, of course, the assumed zero (actually negative) product of the pool of excess labor that we are implicitly associating with the outcome of a market-determined real exchange rate and allocation of domestic and international savings. This provides a free lunch that everyone can share through current Asian policies.
We have done some simulations with plausible rates of accumulation and returns and find that the transition to the new steady state need not imply a large continuing net transfer. So the system ends with a smooth adjustment. The government of China for example would have a more productive capital stock and will have managed to employ 200 million people in world-level wage jobs. The US will own a nice chunk of the Chinese capital stock, and will have made a fine excess return during its accumulation. There are even mutually offsetting cross-border claims against each other that can serve as escrow against confiscation.
During the adjustment period, many dimensions of this development program are distorted in the periphery. But one thing that is not distorted is the knowledge that at the end of the transition capital invested in traded-goods industries will have to compete on an equal basis with capital invested in other countries. We see no practical alternative to imposing this discipline on an emerging market and at the same time accelerating the absorption of a large and politically dangerous pool of labor. The feasibility of maintaining an undervalued exchange rate through monetary policy and controls on domestic and international capital markets for a long time can, of course, be questioned. But this is an empirical question. At the moment we do not see a mechanism in the case of many Asian countries for significant circumvention of their financial arrangements and regulations.
